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ABSTRACT
One hundred male and female undergraduate students served as 
mock jurors. Subjects read four automobile accident summaries. For 
each case, subjects judged the defendant's responsibility, the plain­
tiff 's responsebility, and evaluated the severity of consequences.
In each case, the deservingness of the victim to suffer, and the 
severity of the accidental consequences were varied. In addition, a 
median split was done on subjects' locus of control scores to define 
a third treatment variable. Therefore, the study was a 2 (Internal 
vs. External) x 2 (High Severity vs. Low Severity) x 2 (High Deserv­
ingness vs. Low Deservingness) mixed factorial design. Results 
indicated that subjects compensated plaintiffs and defendants in line 
with hypotheses derived from equity theory for the distribution of 
rewards and punishments. Specifically, defendants received harsher 
punishments when the accident consequences were more severe for the 
plaintiff than for less severe consequences. However, when plaintiffs 
were in high deservingness to suffer situations (intoxicated but 
just below legal limit) compensation was less than for more respec­
table plaintiffs in low deservingness to suffer situations (non­
drinking). Subjects' locus of control scores were found to only 
affect the extent that responsibility was derogated to plaintiffs.
That is, externals attributed more responsibility to plaintiffs than 
internals. Results are discussed with regard to equity theory.
1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
To date there have been numerous studies that have dealt with 
attribution of responsibility by observers for victims of unwarranted 
consequences. These studies have been attempts to determine the 
underlying factors that account for differences for the manner that 
observers attribute responsibility. Two prominant approaches have 
emphasized individual differences, that is, the extent that a person 
believes the world is just, and the belief in personal causation as 
regards to the lots of others. This present study reviewed earlier 
studies that dealt with attribution of responsibility, and then 
examined more closely those studies concerned with personality variables 
that effect responsibility attribution. Then a suggestion was offered 
in order to better understand the reason individuals differ for their 
attribution of responsibility to another.
Attribution of Responsibility 
There is evidence that things that happen to another person, even 
when these events are beyond the other’s control, may have a large 
effect on our own attitudes toward him. While Walster (1966) proposed 
that when individuals hear about an accident, they will be sure to 
blame someone for the accident; Lerner (1965. 1966)- argued that people 
are motivated to believe in a njust world," where people "get what 
they deserve, and deserve what they get."
.Walster (1966) in addition to proposing that people desire to 
blame others for accidental consequences they encounter in order to 
have the world seem, to be a predictable place, also predicted that the
2tendency to assign responsibility to someone will increase as the 
magnitude of the consequences.increase. The assignment of responsi­
bility occurs through a process Walster called defensive attribution.
She argued that it is easy for the observer to feel sympathy for the 
sufferer of a small loss and attribute the misfortuen to chance. How­
ever, for an observer to attribute a severe accidental outcome to 
chance implies that a catastrophe of equal magnitude could happen to 
themself. Alternatively, by derogating the responsibility of the 
grave outcome to the victim, the perceiver is convinced that they are 
a different kind of person from the victim, or would have behaved 
differently under the circumstances, the observer can reassure them­
self of being protected from a similar catastrophe.
Walster (1966) tested this hypothesis by describing a high school 
student's driving habits to a group of subjects. Subjects were asked 
to asses the responsibility of the driver whose parked and empty 
automobile was involved in an accident when it rolled down a hill.
In her description, she varied the severity of the accident that was 
said to have resulted from the same pre-accident behavior. The 
accident conditions ranged from damage only to the car with no harm 
to others, and damage to the car with the possibility of Injury to 
others. Walster*s (1966) findings were in accordance with the predicted 
attribution of responsibility. Sex differences indicated that women 
were more likely to assign more responsibility as the possible conse­
quences of the accident were increased. However, no explanation was 
offered by Walster. Furthermore, the results indicated that the 
student’s behavior was judged to be more "morally unacceptable" the 
more severe the consequences were said to be for both men and women.
3The plausibility of Walster*s (1966) prediction for the increased 
assignment of responsibility as the magnitude of the severity of conse­
quences increases has been explored in a line of research by Lerner 
and his associates (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966),
Lerner (1965, 1967) proposed that people need to believe in a 
just world and that they are motivated to distort reality in order to 
maintain the belief that such a world is indeed just. The research 
supported the notion that a person takes into account the outcomes of 
a social event in making sense out of what he has observed even when 
the outcome is fortuitously related to behavior. Lerner and his asso­
ciates (Lerner & Simmons, 1966) asserted that the motive to distort 
reality leads individuals to derogate and blame people who have suffered 
by devaluation and refection even if this suffering haS occurred pre­
sumably for a sufferer who is innocent of responsibility. Sex of 
subject was not examined in Lerner*s early studies (Lerner, 1965, 1966, 
1967) since only female subjects were used for his formulation of the 
just world notion.
Lerner and Matthews (1967) asserted that the underlying process 
postulated in Lerner*s (1965, 1966) earlier studies was based on a 
person's need to believe in a just world in which people deserve their 
fate. Furthermore, they reasoned that a person's fate is a result of 
what that person does, and it is only when an observer cannot attribute 
some misdeed to a suffering victim that the observer will derogate the 
victim as an undersirable person. Lerner argued that derogation as 
a distortion of reality was a result of the observer's desire to avoid 
such misfortune himself and. to maintain a view that the world-is just.
However, Lerner, Miller, and Holmes (1976) stated that observers of 
what appears' to be unjust suffering do not necessarily resort to 
derogation of a victim automatically and uniformly. Among the poten­
tially numerous means by which an individual may restore his concept 
of a just world include compensation and/or punishment of a tormenter; 
the victim may be blamed without being devalued; and/or the observer 
may deny that the suffering has even occurred. Lerner et al. (1976) 
suggested that compensation of an innocent victim is generally the 
preferred method. However, when an individual is unable to alter the 
state of affairs, a comfortable solution to reduce the sense of 
injustice is to ultimately devalue the victim. Kenrick, Reich, and 
Ciaidini (1976) have shown that both compensation and derogation may 
be used; therefore, not to be taken necessarily as being mutually 
exclusive.
One theory that may be likened to the just world theory is that 
of social exchange, in particular, equity theory (Adams, 1963» 1965).
The concern of equity theory is the manner that an individual responds 
to an injustice, such as by an. attempt to restore actual equity, or 
equal relative outcomes for those persons involved. Alternatively, 
an individual may.respond by distorting reality as suggested by a just 
world notion, in order to restore psychological equity. This would be 
especially likely to occur when the case is such that observers or 
participants are unable to restore actual equity. Additionally, an 
observer may respond to a situation by using a combination of both 
responses, partially restoring actual equity and sufficiently distorting 
reality to establish psychological equity. Therefore, it appears 
that the equity theory accounts for the situations that individuals
utilize a just world perception, that is, when actual equity cannot 
be restored.
The approach taken by an individual depends on costs and benefits 
perceived to be associated with each strategy. Equity theory is based 
on the assertion that observers can evaluate the fairness of an inter­
action more objectively than can participants, to the point that even 
the most aloof judges are motivated to right existing wrongs, and if 
that fails, to be convinced that this is a just world (Austin, Walster, 
& Utne, 1976). Equity theory predicts that the effect of a defendant's 
suffering determines a judge's or juror's liking for him and their, 
eagerness to punish. Suffering by a defendant as a result of a crime 
may be regarded as punishment in itself which compensates further pun-, 
ishment. Such was the case for a bank robber who was crippled when 
making a getaway and who received an unusually light sentence, and the 
mother whose child was killed when she ran a stop sign treated with 
similar leniency (Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976).
Further evidence that demonstrates that jurors take a criminal's 
"suffering in the act" into account when deciding on an appropriate 
sentence comes from two studies by Austin (1976). In both studies, 
Austin asked college students to read a synopsis of the proceedings 
of an actual trial and play the role of the mock jurors, and then 
recommend an appropriate sentence. In the first study, the defendant 
snatched a purse,.a relatively minor crime. In the second study, 
the defendant's crime was more serious, not only had he snatched, a 
purse but he had severely beat his female victim causing her to be 
hospitalized, for a number of days. In both studies, after allegedly 
committing the crime, the defendant attempted to escape from the scene.
In the process of escape, it was claimed that the purse snatcher had 
suffered not at all, moderately (i.e., received cuts and bruises), or 
excessively (paralyzed from the neck down). Austin found, in both 
studies strong support for the "suffering in the act" notion. Such 
that, the more the defendant was said to have suffered, for both low 
severity and high severity crimes, the less extensive the prison 
sentence handed down by the mock jurors as being appropriate sentences.
The severity of outcome of an event as a determinant of responsi­
bility attribution, a concern of both Walster*s and Lerner*s studies, 
is a relationship that Shaver (1970) concluded cannot be reliably 
produced. Shaver has reported two studies, neither of which offered 
support for the proposition that responsibility attribution increases 
with the severity of outcome. However, a study by Shaw and Skolnick 
(1971) provided evidence that partially supported Walster's view 
rather than Lerner's. That is, a person is more likely to blame a 
victim while at the same time regard themself as different from the 
victim. This supposedly protects the observer from a similar fate, 
rather than attribute responsibility for a severe accident in order 
to preserve a person's belief that the world is just.
Moreover, experiments using accident situations have partially, 
demonstrated the observer's desire to find or create a correspondence 
between what happens to someone and what he deserves by virtue of his 
personal attributes. According to Lerner's (19&5, 19&6) just world 
notion, if something (pleasant or unpleasant) happens to a person, 
that person is seen as deserving it for one of two reasons: (a)
because that person is intrinsically good, (or evil), and. their charac­
ter merits the good or bad outcome; or (b) because that person has
behaved in a specific and direct manner to bring out the good or bad 
outcome. Jones and Aronson (1973) tested deservingness in a mock jury 
case on rape victims and predicted that if a catastrophe occurs to an 
individual, more responsibility is attributed to that victim if the 
victim is a respectable person than if he is less respectable. Speci­
fically, Jones and Aronson (1973) found that married and virgin women 
were blamed more than divorced women in a rape case by both male and 
female subjects. There was no significant difference between the actual 
and the attempted rape conditions for the amount of fault attributed 
to the victim. Their results supported the prediction and suggested 
that the more an innocent and respectable victim suffers, the greater 
the threat to one's belief in a just world, and the greater the blaming 
or attribution of responsibility for the victim.
In summary, differences found for observers' attribution of 
responsibility may be due to several factors. Walster (1966) suggested 
severity of consequences serves to increase the responsibility attri­
buted to an innocent victim. This contention is in agreement with 
the just world notion. In addition to severity of outcome, Lerner's 
(1965* 1966) just world notion was concerned with victim deservability.
It was suggested that the more innocent the victim is, the more he is 
seen as deserving his fate, and the more he is blamed for the consequences 
Alternatively, Austin et al. (.1976) contended that suffering in the 
act effects observers consideration for responsibility in order to 
restore equity, such that punishments were less for those defendants 
who suffered as a result of the crime. A just world perception may 
be a contribution factor for restoring psychological equity when actual 
equity is not fulfilled. Jones and Aronson (1973) provided experimental
support for deservability such that, the more respectable the victim 
of rape, the more she was regarded as responsible. Sex of subject as 
a variable does not appear to contribute significantly to differences 
in attribution of responsibility.
Personality Variables Affecting Attribution of Responsibility
Belief in a just world.refers to a person's desire to view the 
world as a just place where people get what they deserve and deserve 
what they get. This construct was used by Lerner et al. (1976) in 
order to suggest that those who. see what appears to be unjust suffering 
will reduce the sense of injustice by derogation the victim under 
certain circumstances. Deservingness, according to Lerner, consists 
of two components: .personal worth and behavior. Therefore, observers 
of a victim may conclude (a) that the victim is an undesirable person, 
or (b) that the victim behaved poorly and brought his suffering 
upon themself.
Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975) devised and validated a direct 
simple paper-and-pencil measure to assess the degree to which people 
would express the belief that they lived in a just world ("Just World 
Scale"). They assumed that the belief in. a just world was a relatively 
stable and measurable dimension along which people would vary and the 
degree of acceptance of this belief should be predictive of people's 
reactions in a variety of situations. For example, in one study (Rubin 
& Peplau, 1973), it was found that people who scored, highly on the 
JWS were relatively unsympathetic to peers who were less fortunate 
than they were in a draft lottery.
Kerr and Kurtz (197?) in a replication of the Jones and Aronson 
(1973) study used the Rubin and Peplau (1973) dust World Scale to
assess subject differences. This scale was used in order to determine 
directly whether the Jesuits for attribution of responsibility could 
be attributed to. differences in beliefs for a just world, rather than 
speculate that the results were due to a just world process by infer­
ence. Kerr and Kurtz (1977) used the length of sentence for the 
defendant in addition to attribution of responsibility as dependent 
measures. They found that the defendant was given a longer sentence 
when the victim suffered more, as a means of compensation for:the 
suffering victim. This factor was in support of the just world theory. 
Results were inconsistent for sex of subject differences, however, it 
was found that females thought the victim suffered more than males and 
were more likely to give longer sentences to the defendant.
However, other predictions that followed from the theory uniformly 
failed (Kerr & Kurtz, 1977). The respectable and suffering victim was 
neither blamed nor devalued more than a victim who was less respectable 
or suffered less. In addition, those who believed most strongly that 
the world is just were not more likely to punish the defendant or 
blame the victim, and even gave more positive evaluations of the victim 
than thosewith a weak belief in the just world. Kerr and Kurtz (1977) 
stated this result does not necessarily disconfirrn the just world 
theory if strong.believers generally give more positive evauations of 
others. However, Rubin and Peplau (1975) have not indicated that 
there is such a general bias in the research that has employed a just 
world scale.
One reason why the results were nonsignificant for the Kerr and 
Kurtz (1977) study may be found in a study that was done by Phares 
and Wilson (1972). At times situations can be differentiated on.the
1°
basis of a structural-ambiguity dimension. Therefore, this allows 
for the possibility that severe outcomes lead to greater responsibility 
attribution when situations are highly structured but not when situa­
tions are ambiguous remains plausible. Phares and Wilson (1972) 
explored this prediction and suggested that structured situations were 
those such that the connection between person: and outcome is very 
direct while ambiguous situations were those in which the connection 
between person and outcome is not very clear, such that the events are 
chance-determined as a function of environmental events over which 
those persons involved have no control.
Rubin and Peplau (1973) concluded that the belief in a just world 
is not the only determinant of indifference toward victims of society, 
rather numerous other individual and cultural factors play important 
roles in shaping the tendency to perceive others as deserving their 
lots. It has been demonstrated (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) that high Just 
World scores were correlated with a tendency to score in the internal 
diredtion on the locus of control scale (r = -.44, p <  .001). This 
association is congruent with a just world notion that a belief in a 
just world stems from people’s desire to believe that they can control 
their own outcomes.
The internal-external locus of control dimension (Rotter, 1966) 
is one that has received much attention for‘the assessment of individual 
differences (Lefcourt, 1'976; Phares, 1976). The I-E scale has demon­
strated its utility over a wide range of predictive situations that 
have provided evidence for its construct validity (Phares, 1976). Due 
to the construct validity and predictability for the locus of control 
dimension (Phares, 1976) it is proposed that this dimension is a
11
moderator variable for individual differences with regard to responsi­
bility attribution.
Phares and Wilson (1972) introduced internal versus external 
control of reinforcement (I-E) as a determinant for individual differ­
ences of attribution of responsibility. The I-E dimension refers to 
the degree that people regard themselves as responsible for the 
occurrence or lack of occurrence of reinforcement (internals) as opposed 
to regarding luck, fate, chance, powerful others etc*, (externals) as 
being responsible. Phares and Wilson found that in severe cases internals 
attributed more responsibility than externals, when the stimulus situ­
ations were ambiguous. When the stimulus situations were highly 
structured there was little in the way of I-E differences. When severity 
of outcomes were low, however, internals did not differ In responsibility 
attribution under ambiguous conditions, but under structured conditions 
internals attributed greater responsibility than did externals.
Locus of control and attribution of responsibility have been 
investigated in other studies. For example, Phares, Wilson, and 
Klyver (19?1) noted that internals attribute less blame for their 
failure on tasks to the environment than, do externals. Furthermore, 
in a study involving both success and failure, Davis and Davis (1972.) 
demonstrated that internals show a greater tendency to accept 
responsibility for their behaviors than do externals. In addition,
Krovetz (197^ -) found that subjects (either internals or externals) 
form attributions to account for their successes and failures that 
are congruent with the^r locus of control as determined by the I-E 
scale.
Phares and Wilson (1972) Indicated that use ofexperimental conditions
12
that do not involve quasi-legal judgements, as was the case in the 
Phares, et al. (1971) and Davis and Davis (1972) studies, should 
produce the predicted interaction between I-E and ambiguous-structured 
factors. They also reasoned that the nonsevere, ambiguous combination 
may be so. compelling that both internals and externals are unwilling 
to attribute much responsibility. However, when the outcome becomes 
sevorc, they felt thi3 serves to produce individuals* reliance on 
their generalized expectency as internals or externals for attribution 
of responsibility.
In summary, personality variables that have been forwarded to 
account for differences in observers attribution of responsibility 
were examined. The just world scale developed by Rubin and Peplau 
(1973) was used in a study by Kerr and Kurtz (1977) that investigated 
victim deservingness. However, Kerr and Kurtz did not obtain results 
that conclusively accounted for observer differences as determined by
a belief in a just world for attribution of responsibility. Another
/
construct, locus of control, was considered as regards to a study by 
Phares and Wilson. (1972). Based on their findings it may be that the 
structure of the situations that Kerr and Kurtz (1977) used overrode 
individual differences predicted by just world beliefs. Due to the 
construct validity of the locus of control dimension, and the 
correlation with.the just world scale, it would seem that the locus 
of control dimension may provide a stronger basis for prediction for 
observer differences for responsibility attribution.
A comparison of Kerr and Kurtz (1977) just world, study and Phares' 
and Wilson's (1972) locus of control study will point out the differ-* 
ences in factors examined (see Figure l). Both studies examined the
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Figure 1. Comparison of Kerr and Kurtz (1977) just world study 
with Phares' and Wilson's (1972) locus of control (I-E) study.
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effects of attribution of responsibility, however, individual differences 
were just world measures or locus of control measures. While attribu­
tion of responsibility was examined for primarily the plaintiff (rapee) 
in the just world study, degree of punishment was also examined for 
the defendant. However, in the locus of control study only responsi­
bility attribution was considered for the defendant, while any 
contributions by plaintiff for the outcome were ignored. The present; 
study investigated underlying processes for attribution of responsibility 
to the plaintiff using a locus of control I-E subject variable.
It will be noted, that both studies considered severity of out­
come (high and low) to. have an effect on responsibility attribution. 
Deservingness for victim suffering was manipulated in the just world 
study by varying the victim's respectability. However, defendant 
characteristics were ignored. There was no manipulation for deserving­
ness of victims's fate in the locus of control study, only attribution 
of responslbility measures were considered, for the defendant.
Phares and Wilson (1972) have suggested that situation character­
istics are an important factor for responsibility attribution. There­
fore, the locus of control study manipulated, this variable (high and 
low) such that, structured and ambiguous cases were examined.
Structured situations meant that judges felt that it was clear that 
the defendant was substantially at fault. Ambiguous meant that from 
the accident description it was not clear that the defendant was 
substantially at fault or that accompanying conditions were such as 
to significantly reduce his guilt. The just world study by using 
rape cases, considered only structured cases such that guilt was 
clear for the defendant.
15
Another differences between the studies that is determined largely 
by the structured-ambiguity dimension is the extent the consequences 
were due to chance. The just world study provided a condition in which 
there was little chance saliency due to the nature of the crime, such 
that in addition to the high association of guilt for the defendant, 
there was a motivational- factor initiating the crime. Taken together, 
these factors seem to override any characteristics of the victim which 
may account for failures to replicate the Jones and Aronson (1973) 
findings by subsequent studies.
The locus of control study, on the other hand, provided conditions 
which varied, the structured-ambiguity dimension. For all conditions, 
however, there was. high chance saliency for the nature of the consequences, 
and presumably no motivation on the part of the defendant to initiate 
an automobile, accident.
Statement of the Problem
It was the purpose of this study to examine the effect deserving­
ness has for attribution of responsibility as predicted by.the just 
world theory. However, rather than using the just world scale, locus 
of control (I-E) was the measure of individual differences, for the 
judges. Generalized expectancies for a person's locus of control have 
been shown to depend on the assertion that internally oriented people 
not only see themselves as responsible for events, but will also see 
others as responsible for their own outcomes (Phares & Wilson, 1972). 
Conversely, externals may tend to attribute less responsibility to 
others just as they do to themselves. Due to the construct validity 
and predictability for the locus of control scale (Phares, 1976;
Lefcourt, 1976), it was predicted that this dimension would demonstrate
individual differences as regards to attribution of responsibility for 
differences for victim deservingness.
Based on the results of the Phares and Wilson (1972) study, it 
appears that only locus of control differences will be produced by 
ambiguous situations that have severe consequences. Therefore, this 
present study used only ambiguous situations. It was the contention 
of this study that the structural-ambiguity dimension accounted for 
contradictions found for previous studies that dealt with attribution 
of responsibility in a just world framework (e.g., Jones & Aronson,
1973; Kerr & Kurtz, 1977). Furthermore, it is suggested that attribution 
of responsibility did not occur in the manner predicted by the just 
world theory because of the high situation structure for rape cases.
Due to the descriptions of the cases by Kerr and Kurtz such that guilt 
was clear for the defendant when the crime was completed, it would 
seem easier to blame the defendant rather than attribute responsibility
X
to the victim regardless of deservingness. This would seem especially 
true since the victim was described in a typical situation which could 
be assumed to occur regularly, that is, walking to her parked car after 
an evening class at a university. Therefore, a victim following a 
routine that has little to do with chance, is a structured situation. 
Additionally, it is a situation that obviously would have little to do 
with the respectability dimension such as married, virgin, or divorced 
victims used by Jones and Aronson (1973) ancI the replication by 
Kerr and Kurtz (1977).
In addition to deservingness and locus of control, outcome 
severity was examined., since it has been demonstrated that responsibility 
attribution increases with outcome severity (Walster, 1966; Phares &
17
Wilson, 1972).
In summary, the objectives for this study were to test (a) the 
effect of plaintiff's deservingness to suffer, (b) severity of outcome 
to the plaintiff, and (c) observer's locus of control on attribution 
of responsibility in ambiguous situations.
Hypotheses
In summary, the following predictions were tested: (1) main
effect for deservingness, such that, the more respectable the plaintiff, 
manipulated by deservingness of the plaintiff to suffer (a) the more 
responsibility attributed to the defendant; and (b) the greater the 
sentence recommendations for the defendant; and (c) the less responsible 
the plaintiff will be judged.
(2) Main effect for severity, such that, the more severe the 
accident, (a) the more responsibility attributed to the defendant; and
(b) the greater the sentence recommendations for the defendant; and
(c) the more responsible the plaintiff will be judged.
(3) No interaction between deservingness main effect and severity 
main effect was predicted.
(4) Main effects should be strongest for those who have an internal 
locus of control orientation. That is, this study proposed to inves­
tigate the effects on attribution of responsibility for two levels of 
I-E (internals and externals), two levels of severity of outcome (high 
and low), two levels of defendant deservingness (high and low), and 
nine different dependent measures (for defendant: statement of respon­
sibility, imposition of fines, license suspension or jail, and driver 
re-education; for plaintiff: statement of responsibility, judgement
for medical expenses, judgement for coverage of car repairs, extent
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of pain and suffering retributions, and judgement for outcome 
severity).
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CHAPTER II.
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 100 male and female undergraduate psychology 
students at UNO who received extra course credit for their partici­
pation. Subjects were administered the locus of control test and 
stimulus materials at the same time. Scores on the locus of control 
scale ranged from 2 to 1_2 with a median of 12. Internal subjects 
were defined as those with scores below 1_2, while-external subjects 
were defined as those with scores above 12.
Desi gn
A 2(I-E) x-2(Severit.y). x 2(Deservingness) mixed design (1 between 
and 2 within factors) was employed. All subjects were presented with 
four accident summaries adapted from the Phares and Wilson (1972) 
study (see Appendix B).
Both internal and external subjects received four combinations 
of severity and deservingness scenarios. There were four scenarios, 
each having four versions for severity and deservingness. Therefore, 
each subject received one version of each of the four scenarios in 
order to be presented, with all possible combinations of severity and 
deservengness. There were, therefore, 16 setting produced. A random 
assignment of settings comprised the four stimuli that subjects received. 
Independent Variables
The principal independent measures were two levels of plaintiff 
deservingness to suffer (high and low), severity of consequences 
for the plaintiffs (high and low), and locus of control (internal
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and external). In general, plaintiffs deservingness referred to 
plaintiffs contributions to the accident in such a manner as.to 
have potentially avoided or not to have avoided the accident.
Severity of outcome referred to the extent of bodily injury and/ 
or property damage to the plaintiff. A median split was performed on 
the last factor (locus of control). All accident summaries were 
ambiguous such that from the accident description it was not clear 
that the defendant was substantially at fault or that accompanying 
conditions were such as to significantly reduce the guilt (see 
.Appendix 3).
Dependent Variables
The principal dependent measures were seven-point unipolar scales 
for two categories, on© for the defendant, the other for the plaintiff. 
The measures for the defendant were: (a) judgement of defendant's
responsibility for the accident, (b) imposition - of fines, (c) license 
suspensions or jail, and (d) driver re-education.
The measures for the plaintiff were: (a) judgement of plaintiff's
responsibility, (b) judgement for payment of medical expenses, (c) 
judgement for;-payment of car damage expenses, and (d) extent of pain 
and suffering retributions.
The manipulation checks consisted of seven-point unipolar scales 
that assessed each subject's perception for each of the four scenarios 
as regards severity of the accident for the plaintiff, and deserving­
ness for the plaintiff to suffer.
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Procedure
Subjects were administered the Locus of Control Scale (Rotter,
1966; see Appendix A) and the stimulus materials, accident summaries 
simultaneously. The size of experimental groups varied with number 
of subjects who arrived as scheduled for experimental sessions ranging 
from 2_ to jL6 subjects.
Each subject received a stimulus booklet for which conditions 
had been counter-balanced and randomly assigned. Each booklet contained 
the following instructions:
This is a study which deals with the American jury 
system. We have taken a series of brief legal summaries 
of court cases which were printed in the Midwest Auto Digest 
and assembled them into booklets. We would like you to 
read these summaries and then make certain judgements.
The purpose of this research is to determine how closely 
your judgements correspond to the actual judgements and 
verdicts of the real juries. In this way, we may be able 
to learn something about the manner in which information 
should be presented to juries so that they can better pro­
cess it and reach valid conclusions. Ultimately, it may 
then be possible to move toward computerization of some of 
these processes and modes of information presentation.
The following are approximations of actual court cases, 
tried in various Superior Courts.. The plaintiffs were suing 
the defendants for damages. Damages here means money above 
the costs of any property damage or medical expenses, i.e., 
beyond auto repairs or hospital costs. You are to examine 
the evidence and rate the cases on the scales provided.
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As in. an actual court of law, the insurance coverage, or lack 
of it should not be a factor in determining guilt, and will 
not therefore, be specified. As we said before, we are 
comparing your ratings with the actual jury responses.
There followed four brief case descriptions for each subject, 
the following two were typical:
Defendant: Harrison
Plaintiff: Norwick
Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be 
following a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay. 
Suddenly, a bale of hay fell from the truck and landed on 
the road several car lengths in front of Harrison9s car 
causing him to lose control. Harrison1s car crossed, the 
center line and side-swiped Norwick. Norwick received 
very minor cuts and bruises. His car was damaged but only 
slightly. The truck disappeared and was not identified.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck 
too closely--otherwise he could have avoided the hay and 
prevented the accident. In short, Harrison was not alert 
and not a particularly intelligent driver.
Police investigation revealed that Norwick had been 
drinking. However, the recorded alcohol level in a breath 
analysis was just below the legal intoxication limit.
Harrison claims on the other hand, that.no one expects 
to have a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and,' there­
fore, he should not be held accountable, He also claims 
that.he was following a .reasonable distance. The police 
report indicated that there was no trace of alcohol for
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Harrison according to a breath analysis.
Defendant: McGee
Plaintiff: Bell
McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights 
of the car preceding Bell through the turn. McGee's speed 
could not be assessed since there were no skid marks. How­
ever, a pedestrian believes McGee's speed was not excessive.
The collision occured at 11:M0 PM. The weather was clear 
and no mechanical impairments were observed on McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also 
sustained extensive damage to his car. He was still parti­
ally incapacitated for work. Medical testimony indicated 
that there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample from 
Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too 
fast or did not know how to handle a car properly after 
dark. But in either case,, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by 
the lights of an oncoming car,and therefore his responsibi­
lity reduced. Police investigation determined McGee had not 
been drinking prior to the accident.
This particular Harrison versus Norwick version represented a 
nonsevere situation such that deservingness is low for the defendant. 
The example version for McGee versus Bell case represented a situation 
such that deservingness is high for the defendant and the outcome is 
severe. Of the 16 scenarios, four were presented to each subject (one 
version for each of four cases) so that each subject received all
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combinations. Of the four presented, one was high deservingness- 
severe, one low deservingness-severe, one high deservingness-non- 
severe, and one low deservingness-nonsevere.
After each case description, subjects were asked to make ratings 
for the defendant and plaintiff. .The ratings consisted of seven-point 
bipolar scales.. The first rating for the defendant consisted of the 
regard for defendants' responsibility for the accident. The other 
defendant ratings were each within maximum-minumum sentence allocations 
and included jail and/or license suspension, driver re-education, and 
fine. The ratings for the plaintiff were also seven-point bipolar 
scales, that asked for subjects judgements for plaintiffs responsibi­
lity for the accident, to what extent the plaintiff account for his 
own medical expenses and car damages, and the extent of the severity 
of the accident. There also was one open-ended question that requested 
an evaluation of the dollar amount to be indicated for pain and 
suffering experienced by the plaintiff. These scales appear in 
Appendix C.
Upon completion of-'the stimulus materials and rating scales, 
subjects were debriefed and dismissed. Subjects' participation credit 
cards were signed by the experimenter and returned at this time.
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Malnipulatlon Checks
The results of univariate analyses of variance revealed successful 
manipulations of subjects* perceptions for both plaintiffs deserving­
ness and severity of accidental consequences treatments. Subjects 
perceived those plaintiffs who had been drinking, though not legally 
intoxicated, as more deserving to suffer the responsibility for the 
accident (M - 2.80) than those who had not been drinking (M = 1.82),
F (1,98) = 72.01, £ «£ .001. Likewise, subjects regarded the accident 
more severe when plaintiffs incurred major injuries and extensive 
automobile damages (M = 5*0?) than those who received minor cuts, 
bruises and slight automobile damages (M = 2.51), F (1,98) = 573.09,
£ < .001.
Attribution of Responsibility
Multivariate Analysis of Variance. Separate thre-way (Locus of 
Control x Severity x Deservingness) multivariate analyses of variance 
were performed on the variables that pertained to the defendant: 
responsibility, sentence, driver re-education, and fine; and the vari­
ables that pertained to the plaintiff: responsibility, medical expenses,
automobile expenses, and pain and suffering retributions. Defendants 
produced a significant main effect for outcome severity, F (3,92) =
11.17, £ <  .001. In addition, plaintiffs produced a significant main 
effect for locus of control, F (3,92) = 5.84, £ <  .05; severity,
F (3,92) = 8.17, £ ,01; and deservingness, F (3,92) = 18.68, £<. .001.
26
Univariate Analyses of Variance. Separate three-way analyses, of 
variance were performed for each of the eight dependent variables 
that pertained to defendants and plaintiffs. These analyses revealed 
that subjects allocated more responsibility to defendants for high 
severity consequences (fi = .4.02) than for defendants in low severity 
conditions (M = 3.49), F (1,98) = 12.94, £ <C .001; gave harsher license 
suspensions to defendants for severe consequences (M'= 1.62) than for 
defendants in nonsevere conditions (M =1,30), F (1,98) = 34,4?,
£ <  .001; gave a more.extensive driver re-education program to defen­
dants when consequences were severe (M = 3-21) than when consequences 
were nonsevere (M = 2.65), F (1,98) = 17.81, £ .001; and gave a higher
monetary fine to defendants for high severity consequences (M = 2.60) 
than for defendants in low severity consequences (M = 1.90), F (1,98)
= 34.00, £ <  .001.
Subjects were found to differ for their responsibility derogated 
to plaintiffs based upon locus of control orientations. Subjects 
with an external locus of control attributed more fault to plaintiffs 
(M = 2.47) than subjects with an internal orientation (M = 2.15),
F (1,98) = 4.05, £ <  .05. A significant interaction was found for 
locus of control versus severity of consequences, F (1,98) = 4.00,
£ <  .01. Further analysis revealed that subjects with an internal 
orientation gave a stiffer fine (M =: 2.78) to the defendant than 
subjects with an external orientation (M = 2.42), F (1,98) = 1.66,
£ <  .08. This was determined to occur only for situations with highly 
severe consequences.
Additional findings indicated that subjects held plaintiffs less 
accountable for medical expenses when the accident was not severe
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(M - 1.90) than when the accident was severe (M = 2.25), F (1,98) = 
4.30, £ <  .05; and when sober (M - 1.82) than when they had been 
drinking (M = 2.34), F (1,98) =11.34, £ ^  .001. Likewise, plaintiffs 
were held less accountable for car damages when sober (li = 2.15) than 
when Intoxicated (M .= 2.4?), F (1,98). = 3.49, £ <  .10.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
In general, the data did not support the contention that the 
more respectable the plaintiff as determined by deservingness of the 
plaintiff to suffer, the more the defendant would be regarded as res­
ponsible and therefore receive harsher sentence recommendations, 
while the plaintiff held less responsible. Evidently, observers do 
not make judgements for the defendant's and plaintiff's responsibility 
in conjunction as regards to plaintiff's deservingness to suffer.
Rather, observers considered the plaintiffs deservingness to suffer 
only for the plaintiff when judging the amount of responsibility 
assigned to the plaintiff and the extent plaintiffs were accountable 
for their own damages. If one can assume the plaintiffs deservingness 
to suffer as analogous with Jones' and Aronson's (1973) respectable- 
nonrespectable va.riable for victim deservingness, then their results 
were not replicated. This is because plaintiff deservingness did not 
affect observers assignment of responsibility to the defendant.
On the other hand, the data supported the contention that the more 
severe the accident consequences for the plaintiff, the more responsible 
the defendant was judged, and the more extensive the sentence recommen­
dations. This finding is in accordance with Walster's (1966) prediction 
that the responsibility one assigns increases as the magnitude of con­
sequences increases. However, the severity of consequences did not 
have an affect on the observers assignment of responsibility to the 
plaintiff. As was predicted, no interaction was found between deser­
vingness and severity main effects.
The data did not support the prediction that the main effect for 
deservingness would be strongest for those observers who have an inter­
nal locus of control orientation. However, the data did support the 
prediction that internals would judge the defendant as more responsible 
when accident consequences were severe due to the harsher fine recom­
mendations given by internals. Therefore, in part, the result were 
found to support Phares* and Wilson's (1972) findings fo.r locus of 
control dimension as a determinant for individual differences of 
attribution of responsibility. This is because they had found that 
severe cases produced an internal-external effect such that internals 
derogated defendants more than externals when stimulus situations were 
ambiguous rather than structured. In addition the results of this 
present study indicated that observers' locus of control orientation 
affected the degree of fault assigned to plaintiffs. Externals 
assigned more fault to the plaintiffs than internals.
The derogation of a highly respectable victim appears to be evident 
in cases where the victim is clearly innocent, as was the finding for 
a typical rape case (Jones & Aronson, 1973) such that the guilt of the 
defendant is highly unambiguous. However, when the guilt of the defen­
dant is ambiguous, then it is very likely that the highly respectable 
plaintiff will not be derogated, as was the finding of this present 
study. Phares and Wilson (1972) did not examine perceived deserving- 
ness for the victim to suffer nor the affect that victim deservingness 
has for defendant blame and punishment.
Another explanation for why the respectable plaintiff was not 
regarded as deservingness the outcomes and derogated with more respon­
sibility may be due to the manner jurors formulate their perceptions
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of the accident. In order to determine a person's estimate of victim 
deservingness, people use several considerations such as the contri­
butions made by those involved in a situation, their needs as a result 
of the situation, and consideration for equal treatment (Leventhal, 
1976). Furthermore, a person uses separate computational routes to 
estimate the victim's deservingness, and then combines these estimates 
in order to arrive'at an overall judgement of deservingness. Generally, 
people judge those involved in a situation fairly by giving them out­
comes they deserve, but sometimes may be unable to change their actual 
outcomes. In such cases, according to Leventhal (1976), people may 
change their perceptions of the victim's behavior, for example, by 
derogation them. Since the jurors in this present study were able to 
alter the outcomes for the plaintiff to some extent, that is, allow 
for greater compensation, there was no need to derogate the highly 
respectable plaintiff.
Therefore, it seems that the reason the present results occured 
may best be explained in terms of equity theory (eg., Austin, Walster,
& Utne, I976, Leventhal, 1976) That is to say, jurors applied equity 
principles for consideration of mitigating circumstances ("inputs) 
for determing rewards and handing down sentences (outcomes).
Qualitatively, an equitable relation can be determined from the
following basic equation: outcomesA - inputsA = outcomesB - inputsB
inputsa inputsB
(Adams, I965). Applying this equation to the findings obtained from 
this study,, one finds that equitable relations result. This is because, 
those plaintiffs regarded as less than respectable had outcomes 
significantly reduced for reparations due to the input of having been 
drinking. This balances with the regard for the defendant who was
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considered to have little or no responsibility for the accident (input), 
therefore little punishment (outcome) was suggested by the jurors.
In summary, the less respectable plaintiff was perceived as more 
deservingness to suffer responsibility for the consequences, and 
observers decreased the blame and punishment for the defendant. In 
addition, plaintiffs were compensated less when they were regarded as 
more deserving to suffer responsibility for the accident than those 
not deserving to suffer.
On the other hand, severe accident consequences were viewed as 
inputs for the defendant such that harsher punishments were suggested 
by the jurors (outcomes). In order to restore equity to the plaintiff 
for the severe consequences, plaintiffs were regarded as less deserving 
to suffer (input), which was most notable for non-drinking plaintiffs, 
and greater reparations (outcomes) were suggested by the jurors.
It appears therefore, that jurors take into consideration moral 
and ethical aspects for plaintiffs in awarding direct compensation to 
them, but have less regard for such factors when they pertain directly 
to defendant sentencing. In other words, jurors allocate rewards and 
punishments to plaintiffs and defendants based upon the perceived 
deservingness of each in order to restore equity to those involved. 
Plaintiffs deservingness to be rewarded and compensated is a function 
of their perceived moral and legal innocence, while the severity of 
consequences determines defendants deservingness to be punished.
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SOCIAL REACTION INVENTORY
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain-, 
important events in our society affect different people. Each item 
consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the 
one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly 
believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select 
the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you 
think you should choose or the one you would like to be true. This 
is a measure of personal belief, obviously there are no right or 
wrong answers.
Your answer, either a or b to each question on this inventory, 
is to be reported on the answer sheet. Print your name and any 
other information requested by the examinar on the answer sheet, then 
finish reading these directions. Do not begin until you are told to 
do so.
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much
time on any one item. Be'sure to find an answer for every choice.
For each numbered question make an X on the line beside either the 
a^ or b, whichever you choose as the statement most true.
In some instances you may discover that you believe both state­
ments or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you
more strongly believe to be the case as far a you.’re concerned. Also 
try to respond to each item independently when making your choice; do 
not be influenced by your previous choices.
REMEMBER
Select that alternative which you personally believe to be more true.
I more strongly believe that:
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them
too much
b-. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents 
are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due
to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people
don't take enough interest in politics,
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try;to
prevent them.
l4-. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this
world.
b. Unfortunately, and individual's worth often passes unrecognized 
no matter how hard he tries.
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5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students in nonsense,
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades
are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader,
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have.not taken
advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you,
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand
how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality, 
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're
like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen,
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as
making a decision to take a definite course of action.
10.. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if
ever such a thing as an unfair test, 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course
work that studying is really useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little
or nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place
at the ri ght time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in goverment decisions,
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is
not much the little guy can do about it.
13. a,. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them.
work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. .
lh. a. ' There are certain people who are just no good,
b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. Jn my case getting, what I want has little or nothing to do
with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping
a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough
to be in the right place first, 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability,
luck has little or nothing to do with it.
40
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the
victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control, 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the 
people can control world events.
18. a. Most people can't realize the extent to which their lives are
controlled by accidental happenings, 
b. There really is no such'thing as "luck".
V
19. a. One should always be willing to admit his mistakes, 
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person
you are.
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen, to us are balanced
by the good ones, 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, 
laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption, 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the
things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the
grades they give, 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard. I study and the
grades I get.
24. a, A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what
they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things
that happen to me. 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays
an important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if
they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that 1 don't have enough control over the
direction my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave
the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad goverment
on a national as well as on a local level.
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APPENDIX B 
Stimulus Materials
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Defendant: Harrison.
Plaintiff: Norwick
Harrison was driving home from work and' happened to be following 
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay. Suddenly, a bale of 
hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths 
in front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control, Harrison’s 
car crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick. Norwick received 
very minor cuts and bruises. His car was damaged but only slightly.
The truck disappeared and was not identified.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—  
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent 
driver.
Harrison claims on the other hand, that no one expects to have 
a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should 
not be held accountable. He also claims that he was following a 
reasonable distance.
The police report indicated that neither Harrison or Norwick 
had been drinking alcohol according to the results of a breath 
analysi s.
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Defendant: Harrison
Plaintiff: Horwick
Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following 
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay. Suddenly, a bale of 
hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in 
front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control. Harrison’s car 
crossed the center line and side-swiped llorwick. Worwick received 
very minor cuts and bruises. His car was damaged but only slightly.
The truck disappeared and. was not identified.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—  
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent 
driver.
Police investigation revealed that horwick had been drinking. 
However, the recorded alcohol level in a breath analysis was just 
below the legal intoxication limit.
Harrison Claims on the other hand, that no one expects to have 
a bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not 
be.held accountable. He also claims that he was following a reasonable 
distance. The police report indicated that there was no trace of 
alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant: Harrison
Plaintiff: Norwick
Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following 
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay. Suddenly, a bale of 
hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in 
front of Harrison’s car causing him to lose control, Harrison’s car 
crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick. Norwick’s car 
received extensive damage. The truck disappeared and was not identi­
fied. Medical testimony established that Norwick received numerous 
multiple fractures, severe internal bleeding and. was not able to 
resume work for a considerable period of time (8 months after the 
accident). According to a blood sample, there was no trace of 
alcohol for Norwick.
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—  
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the acident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent 
driver.
Harrison claims on the other hand that no one expects to have a 
bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not 
be held accountable. He also claims that he was following a reasonable 
distance. The police report indicated that there was no trace of 
alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant: Harrison
Plaintiff: Norwick
Harrison was driving home from work and happened to be following 
a farm truck which was carrying bales of hay. Suddenly, a bale of 
hay fell from the truck and landed on the road several car lengths in 
front of Harrison’s car causing him to. lose control. Harrison’s, car 
crossed the center line and side-swiped Norwick. Norwick’s car 
received extensive damage. The truck disappeared and was not iden­
tified. Medical testimony established that Norwick had received 
numerous fractures, severe internal bleeding and was not able to 
resume work for a considerable period to time (8 months after the 
accident).
Norwick claims that Harrison was following the truck too closely—  
otherwise he could have avoided the hay and prevented the accident.
In short, Harrison was not alert and not a particularly intelligent 
driver.
Medical testimony revealed that Norwick had been drinking prior 
to the accident. However, the recorded alcohol level in a blood sam­
ple was just below the legal intoxication level.
Harrison claims on the otherhand, that no one expects to have a 
bale of hay fall off a truck like that and, therefore, he should not 
be held accountable. He also claims that he was’ following a reasonable 
distance. The police report indicated that there was no trace of 
alcohol according to a breath analysis for Harrison.
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Defendant: Doe
Plaintiff: Rack
Doe claimed the accident (sides/wiping of Rack’s car) was not his 
fault. Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front of 
Rack’s auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child 
that stepped into the street. Doe's claim concerning the child was 
corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity. The 
weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received minor abrasions and damage to his car was not extensive. 
Neither Doe or Rack was reported to have been drinking alcohol 
according to the police report.
Rack claims that although fn all probability the child did step 
in front of Doe’s car, he should have been more alert. After all,
Rack claims, it was 4:00 PM (just when local schools let out) and signs 
clearly indicated that drivers should beware of children.
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Defendant: Doe
Plaintiff: Rack
Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car).was not his 
fault. Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front of 
Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child 
that stepped into the street. Doe's claim concerning the child was 
corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity. The 
weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit.
Rack received minor abrasions and damage to his car was not extensive. 
The results of a breath analysis revealed that Rack had been drinking, 
however, the alcohol level was just below that of the legal intoxica­
tion limit. The police indicated that Doe had not been drinking 
alcohol.
Rack.claims that in all probability the child did step in front 
of Doe's car, he should have been more alert. After .all, Rack claims, 
it was 4:00 PM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly 
indicated that drivers should beware of children.
Defendant: Doe
Plaintiff: Rack
Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car) was. not his 
fault. Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front 
of Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid, striking a 
child that stepped into the street. Doe's claim concerning the child 
was corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity. 
The weathe-r was clear and neiter party was exceeding the speed limit. 
Rack received a whiplash and several fractures, and was incapacitated 
for work (5 months after the accident). Damage to Rack's car was 
considerable. Neither Doe or Rack was reported to have been drinking 
alcohol according to the police report.
Rack claims that in all probability the child did step in front 
of Doe's car, he should have been more alert. After all, Rack claims, 
it was 4:00 EM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly 
indicated that drivers should beware of children.
Defendant: Doe
Plaintiff: Rack
Doe claimed the accident (sideswiping of Rack's car) was not his 
fault. Doe claims that he swerved from his lane striking the front 
of Rack's auto with his rear bumper in order to avoid striking a child 
that stepped into the street. Doe's claim concerning the child was 
corroborated by the testimony of other children in the vicinity.
The weather was clear and neither party was exceeding the speed limit. 
Rack received a whiplash and several fractures, and he was incapacita­
ted for work (5 months after the accident). Damage to Rack's car 
was considerable.
The results of a blood sample revealed that Rack had been 
drinking, however, the alcohol level was just below the legal intoxi­
cation limit. The police report based on a breath analysis, indicated 
no trace of alcohol for Doe.
Rack claims that in all probability the child did step in.front 
of Doe.'s car, he should have been more alert. After all, Rack claims, 
it was 4:00 EM (just when local schools let out) and signs clearly 
indicated that drivers should beware of children.
Defendant: McGee
Plaintiff: Bell
McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the
car preceding Bell through the turn. McGee's speed could not be
assessed since there were no skid marks. However, a pedestrian believes
McGee's speed was not excessive. The collision occured at 11:40 PM.
The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed, on
*
McGee's car. Bell received minor abrasions and damage to his auto was 
only slight.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or 
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark. But in either 
case he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights 
of an oncoming car and, therefore, his responsibility was reduced.
Police reports indicated that neither Bell or McGee had been 
drinking alcohol based on the results of breath analyses.
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Defendant: McGee
Plaintiff: Bell
McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the 
car preceding Bell through the turn. McGee's speed could not be 
assessed since there were no skid marks. However, a pedestrian 
believes McGee's speed was hot excessive. The collision occured at 
ll-:40 PM. The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were 
observed on McGee's car. Bell received minor abrasions and damage to
his auto was only slight. Police testimony stated Bell had been
drinking, however, the alcohol level according to a breath analysis 
was just below the legal intoxication limit.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark. But in either
case, he was not at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights
of an oncoming car and, therefore, his responsibility was reduced. 
Police investigation determined McGee had not been drinking alcohol 
prior to the accident.
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Defendant: McGee
Plaintiff: Bell
McGee claims he was temporarily blinded, by the headlights of the 
car preceding Bell through the turn. McGee's speed could not be 
assessed since there were no skid marks. However, a pedestrian believes 
McGee's speed was not excessive. The collision occured at 11:40 PM.
The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed on 
McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also sustained 
extensive damage to his caP. He was still partially incapacitated 
for work. Medical testimony indicated that there was no trace of 
alcohol in a blood sample from Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or 
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark. But in either 
case, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights 
of an oncoming car and, therefore his responsibility reduced. Police 
investigation determined McGee had not been drinking alcohol prior 
to the accident.
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Defendant: McGee
Plaintiff: Bell
McGee claims he was temporarily blinded by the headlights of the 
car preceding Bell through the turn. McGee's speed could not be 
assessed since there were no skid marks. However, a pedestrian believes 
McGee's speed was not excessive. The collision occured. at 11:40. PM.
The weather was clear and no mechanical impairments were observed on 
McGee's car.
Bell received fractures and internal bleeding and also sustained 
extensive damage to his car. He was still partially incapacitated for 
work.. Medical testimony indicated that the alcohol level in a blood 
sample was just below the legal intoxication limit for Bell.
Bell's lawyer states that either McGee was driving too fast or 
did not know how to handle a car properly after dark. But in either 
case, he was at fault.
McGee's lawyer contends that anyone can be blinded by the lights 
of an oncoming car and, therefore his responsibility reduced. Police 
investigation determined that McGee had not been drinking alcohol 
prior to the accident.
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Defendant: Mills
Plaintiff: Denning
Denning was trabeling west. Mills was traveling east. Mills hit 
a small but deep pothole created.by recent rains. The pothole was very 
difficult to see when drining east. Striking the pothole caused 
Mill£.V tie-rod (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the 
car) to break. Mills' car .went out of control, crossed the center line 
and side-swiped Denning's vehicle causing only moderate damage. 
Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed limit. Denning
suffered minor cuts and bruises.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and 
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert, for bad
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he should 
have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a steering 
breakdown.
Police investigation revealed that neither Mills or Denning had 
been drinking alcohol based upon breath analyses.
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Defendant: Mills
Plaintiff: Denning
Denning was traveling west. Mills was traveling east. Mills hit 
a small but deep pothole created by recent rains. The pothole was very 
difficult to see when drining east. Striking the pothole caused Mill^i 
tie-rod (part of the assemble controlling the steering of the car) to 
break. Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center line and 
'side-swiped Denning's vehicle causing only moderate damage. Witnesses 
said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered minor cuts and bruises. According to the police 
report, Denning had been drinking. However, the breath analysis 
determined that his alcohol level was just below the legal intoxication 
limit.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and 
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control. The 
police report indicated that Mills had. no trace of alcohol in. his 
system according to a breath analysis.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad 
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he 
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had 
a steering breakdown.
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Defendant: M^lls
Plaintiff: Denning
Denning was traveling west. Mills was traveling east. Mill's hit 
a small hut deep pothole created by recent rains. The pothole was 
very difficuot to see when driving east. Striking the pothole caused 
Mills' tie-rod. (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the 
car) to break. Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center'line 
and struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's 
car). Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken bones 
as a result of the collision. He was still not able to work.full-time 
(11 months after the accident). Medical testimony indicated that 
there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and 
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control. A 
police report revealed that Mills had not been drinking alcohol.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad. 
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he 
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had 
a steering breakdown.
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Defendant:. Mills 
Plaintiff: Denning
Denning was traveling west. Mills was traveling east. Mills hit 
a small but deep pothole created by recent rains. The pothole Was 
very difficult to see when driving east. Striking the pothole caused 
Mills' tie-rod (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the 
car) to break. Mills' car went out of control, crossed the center line 
and struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's 
car). Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken 
bones as a result of the collision. He was still not able to work 
full-time (11 months after the accident). Medical testimony indicated 
that there was no trace of alcohol in a blood sample.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and 
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control. A 
police report revealed that Mills had not been drinking alcohol.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad 
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he 
should have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a . 
steering breakdown.
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Defendant: Mills .
Plaintiff: Denning
Denning was traveling west. Mills was traveling east. Mills hit 
a small but deep pothole created by recent rains. The pothole was very 
difficult to see when driving east. Striking the pothole caused Mills' 
tie-rod' (part of the assembly controlling the steering of the car) to 
break. 'ills' car went out of control, crossed the center lane and 
struck Denning's vehicle head-on (causing severe damage to Denning's 
car). Witnesses said both parties were well within the speed, limit.
Denning suffered severe internal bleeding and 3 badly broken 
bones as a. result of the collision. He was still not able to work 
full-time (11 months after the accident).. Medical testimony revealed 
that the alcohol level in a blood sample was just below the legal 
intoxication limit.
Mills argued that he could not anticipate hitting the hole and 
that it was not his fault that his car careened out of control. The 
.'police report indicated that Mills had no trace of alcohol in his 
system according to a breath analysis.
Denning argued that Mills should have been more alert for bad 
road conditions following the recent rains and that, besides, he should 
have had more knowledge about how to control a car that had a steering 
break-down.
APPENDIX C 
Responsibility Attribution Scales
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I. Please rate your feelings about the defendant's responsibility for 
the accident. That is, the degree to which the accident was his 
fault.
Circle one.
Not at all Moderately , Very
responsible responsible responsible
I personally feel he was: 0 1 2 3 ' 5 6
II. Remember. The following court sentences should be considered in
addition to any costs of repairs or medical expenses. I would
recommend that, the judge impose upon the defendant, the following
sentence. Place a check next to one alternative under A, B, and C.
A. _____ 1. Nothing
 __ 2. Suspend his driver's license for one month
  3* Suspend his driver's license for three months
J h. Suspend his driver's license for six months
_____ 5* Suspend his driver's license.for six months and sentence
him to one weekend in jail
  6. Suspend his driver's license and sentence him to three
weekends in jail
_____ 7. Revoke his driver's license completely and sentence him
to one full month in jail
B. _____ 1. Nothing
_____ 2. Recommend that he study the driving manual
  3* Require that he re-read and pass a test on the
driving manual
________ h. Require that he re-read and pass a test on the driving
manual and also take the driving test again
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  5. Require that he spend three sessions in a driver
training course and pass the driving test again
  6. Require that he spend nine sessions in a driver
. training course and pass the driving toct again
  7. Require that he spend 15 sessions in a driver
training course and pass the driving test again
C. Fine of:
_____ 1. Nothing
 2 . $1 - 50
   3. $51 - 100
  h. $101 - 250
 _____ 5. $251 - 500
  6. $501 - 1,000
_____  7. over $1,000
III. Please rate your feelings about the plaintiff’s responsibility for 
the accident. That is, the degree to shich the accident was his
t
f ault.
Circle one.
Not at all Moderately Very
responsible responsible responsible
I personally feel he was: 0 1 2 3 h 5 6
IV. In addition to the sentences recommended for the defendant, I
would, suggest that the plaintiff be accountable for the following
expenses. Place a check next to one alternative under A, and d,
and where appropriate determine the dollar amount.
A. Medical
_ 1. Nothing
   2. 1 - 20%
 3. 21 - ^0$
  h. hi - 60$
  5. 61 - 80$
  6. 81 - 100$
 _____ 7 , 100$ and court costs
B. Car damages
_____ 1. Nothing
  2. 1 - 20%
  3. 21 - ho$
  h. hi - 60%
  5 . 61 - 80$
  6. 81 - 100$
  7- 100$ and inconveniences
C. Pain and suffering, indicate dollar amount: $ ______________
V. Please rate your feelings about the severity of the accident.
That is, the extent that you feel the plaintiff suffered.
Circle one:
Not at all Moderately Very much 
I personally feel he suffered: 0 1 2 3 ^ 5 6
APPENDIX D 
Analysis of Variance Tables and Figure
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Table I
Multivariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Variable s
Source df ' F
Locus of Control (L) 3 3.49*
Severity (S) 3 11.17**
Deservingne'ss (D) 3 < i
Within cell error N(L)) 92
L x S 3 1.36
L x D 3 < 1
S x D 3 1.71
Within cell error (NS(L)) 92
Within cell error (ND(L)) 92
L x S x D 3 < 1
Within cell error (NSD(L)) 92
*p <  .01
**p .001
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TABLE II
Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
Plaintiff Variables
Source df
Locus of Control (L) 
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D.)
Within cell error (N(L))
L x S 
L x D 
L x D
Within cell error (NS(L)) 
Within cell error (i\JD(L))
L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))
3
3
3
92
3
3
3
92
92
3
92
5.6^*
8.17*
18.68*
C i
<  i
<  i
*p.< .001
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TABLE III
Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Responsibility Attributed to Defendant
Source
Locus of Control (L) 
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (N(L))
L x S 
L x D 
S x D
Within cell error (NS(L)) 
Within cell error (ND(L)')
L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))
*p <  .001
df hs F
1 3.80 1.30
.1 28.62 12.94*
1 1.36 < 1
98
1 1.32 < 1
1 < 1  < 1  
1 2.13 3.8O
98 
98
1 1.34 2.72
98
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TABLE IV
Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant License Suspension and/or Jail
Source df MS
Locus of Control (L) 1 <  1
Severity (S) 1 10.24
Deservingness (D) 1 <  1
Within cell error (N(L)) 98
I. x 3 1 2.15
L x D 1 < 1
S x D 1 1.21
Within cell error (NS(L)) 98
Within cell error (ND(L)) 98
L x S x D 1 <  1
Within cell error (USD(L-)) 98
F
1.30 
34.47*
< 1
^  1 
<  1
3.80
2.72
*p <  .001
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TABLE V
Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Driver Re-education
Source
Locus of Control (L) 
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (N(L))
L x S 
L x D 
S x D
VTithin cell error (NS(L)) 
Within cell error (ND(L))
L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))
* p <  .001
df "hS F
1 7.02 1.18
1 31.92 17.81*
1 3.06 • 1
98
1 ^.62 2.58
1 < 1  <T1
1 < 1  <1
98 
98
1 < 1  <  1
98
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TABLE VI
Univariate Analysis of Variance:
Defendant Fine Recommendations
Source MS
Locus of Control (L) 1 < 1
Severity (S) 1 12.25
.Deservingness (D) 1 27.04
Within cell error (N(L)) 98
L x S 1 1.69
L x D 1
S x D 1 < 1
Within cell error (NS(L) 98
Within cell error (ND(L)) 98
I. x S x D 1 1.00
Within cell error (NSD(L)) 98
*P .05.
**p < .001
< 1
34.00** 
<  1
4.00* 
<  1 
<  1
<  1
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TABLE VII
Univariate Analysis of Variance: 
Responsibility Attributed to Plaintiff
Source df MS
Locus of Control (L) 1 10.24
Severity (S) 1 2.56
Deservinpness (D) 1 98.01
Within cell error (l\l(L)) 98
L x S 1 1.44.
L x D 1
S x D 1 <  1
Within cell error (NS(L)) 98
Within cell error (ND(L)) 98
L x S x D 1 <  1
Within cell error (USD(L)) 98
F
.4.05*
2.52
72.01**
1.42
<  1
<  1
<  1
*p <  .05
**p <  .001
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TABLE VIII
Univariate Analysis of Variance: 
Medical Expenses Covered by Plaintiff
df MSSource
Locus of Control (L) 
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (N(L))
L x S 
L x D 
S x D
Within cell error (NS(L)) 
Wi thin cell er^or (UD(L))
L x S x D
Within cell error (USD(L))
t
*P < .05
* * p  < . 0 0 1
1 <1 < 1
1 12.25 4.
1 27.04 11.
98
1 1.69 < 1
1 < 1  <  1
1 < 1  <  1
98
98
1 1.00 < 1
98
30*
34
TABLE IX
Univariate Analysis of Variances: 
Auto Expenses Covered by Plaintiff
Source df MS
Locus of Control (L) 1 6.76
Severity (S) 1 1.21
Deservinsness (D) 1 10.24
Within cell error (W(L)) 98
L x S 1 2.89
L x D 1 <  1
S x D 1 1.21
Within cell error (NS(L)) 98
Within cell error (ND(L)) 98
L x S x. D 1 <C 1
Within cell error (NSD(L)) 98
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TABLE X
Univariate Analysis of Variance: 
Pain and Suffering Retributions
Source df MS
Locus of Control (L) 1 5^358.92
Severity (S') 1 <  1
Deservingness (D) 1 <  1
Within cell error (N(L)) 98
L x S 1 62489.60
L x D 1 < 1
S x D 1 <  i
Within cell error (NS(L)) 98
Within cell error (ND(L)) • 98
L x S x D 1 <  i
Within cell error (NSD(L)) 98
<  i 
10.21
< 1
<  1 
< 1 
<  1
< 1
*p <  .01
7b
TABLE XI
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
Severity of Consequences
Source
Locus of Control (L). 
Severity (S)
Deservingness (D)
Within cell error (h(L))
L x S 
L x D 
S x D
Within cell error (hS(L)) 
Within cell error (hD(L)) 
L x S x D
Within cell error (NSD(L))
*p <  .001
df MS F
1 <f 1 < 1
1 657.92 573.09*
1 4  1 < 1
98
1 3.80 3.3I
1 < 1  <  1
1 < 1  < 1
98
98
1 < 1  < 1
98
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2.80
2.60
^  2.L-003
£
s
Sl
e/£
2.20
2.00
1.80
Internals Externals
Locus of Control
High Severity •
Low Severity
Figure 2. Relationship between severity of outcome and 
locus of control.
APPENDIX E 
Means and Standard Deviation Tables
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TABLE XII
Means and Standard Deviations for Responsibility 
Attribution Variables by Internal and External Subjects
High Victim Severity Low Victim Severity
Dependent Low Defendant High Defendant Low Defendant High Defendant.
Variables Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness
W = 100 X SD X SD X SD X SD
LDefendant 3.86 1.54 4.18 1.62
responsi­
bility
lLicense 1.56 .89
suspensi on 
or jail 
LDri ver 
re-ed
a'Fine 2.55 1.62
Plaintiff 2.90 1.57
respons!- 
hi 1 i ty 
CM ed i ca 1
1.68 .86
3.10 1.86 3.32 1.95
2.6h 1.62
1.88 1.04
2.5A I.89 1.96 1.77
3.52 1.55 3.45 1.39
1.35 .76
I.83
2.71
1.03
1.40
1.25
1.96
1.75
.69
2.58 1.72 2.71 1.69
1.10
.96
2.13 1.81 1.6.7 1.45
expenses 
'Auto 
expenses 
*Pain and 
suffer!np 
retributions
2.58 1.90 2.15 1.92
2432.11
104hh.?l
1623.26
2720.17
2.36 I.87 2.15 1.94
193.64 160.62
1499.17 9i3.ll
'Sever! ty 5.01 1.17 5.12 1.32 2.^9 1.02 2.52 .87
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TABLE XIII
Means and Standard Deviations for Responsibility 
Attribution Variables by Internal Subjects
High Victim Severity Low Victim Severity
Dependent Low Defendant High Defendant Low Defendant High Defendant
Variables Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness
F = 50_________ X SD X SD X SD_______X SD
Defendant
responsi-
bility
aT .Li cense,
suspense on 
jai 1 
aDriver 
re-ed
aFine
bFlainti ff 
responsi- 
bi. li ty 
'Medical 
expenses 
'Auto 
expenses
3.88 1.59 4.08 l.?6 3.26 1.48 3.40 1.50
1.62 .88
3.38 1.80
2.72
2.68
1.72
1.61
2.hO 2.00
^Pain and 2912.02
14150.38
suffering 
retribut.i ons
1.72 .90 1.36 .78 1.18 .52
3.52 2.01 2.62 1.79 2.72 1.74
2.82 1.75 1.78 1.00 1.88 1.10
1.66 .96 2.64 1.45 1.62 .78
1.96 1.94 2.22 1.96 1.70 1.53
2.56 2.08 2.26 2.14 2.60 2.05 2.34 2.16
1370.02 34.44 46.52
2517.54 89.32 169.76
Severity 5.12- 1.21 5.24 1.39 2.34 .96 2.50 .91
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TABLE XIV
Leans and Standard Deviations for Responsibility 
Attribution Variables by Externl; Subjects ■
High Victim Severity Low Victim Severity
Dependent Low Defendant High Defendant Low Defendant High Defendant
Variables ' Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness Deservingness
N = .5Q_________X SD X SD_______X SD_______X SD
‘Defendant 3 . >  1.50 >.28 1 M  3.?8 1.58 3.50 1.69
response - 
bili ty
lT  •License 
suspension 
or jail 
lDriver 
re-ed 
lFine
1.50 .91
"Kedi cal
2.82 1.90
2.38
Plaintiff 3-12 
responsi- 
bilit.y
1.51
1.51
1.64 .83 1.34 .75 1.32 .82
3.12 1.89 2.54 1.67 2.70 1.66
2.46 1.47 1.88 1.06
2.10 1.07 2.78 1.36
2.04 1.11
1.88 1.10
2.68 1.80 1.96 1.60 2.04 I.67 1.64 I.38
expenses 
'Auto 
expenses 
'fain and 
suf feri ng 
retri bntion?
2.60 1.71 2.04 1.69 2.12 I.65 1.96 1.69
1952.20
4439.24
I876.5O
2912.17
352.84
2116.88
274.72
1276.38
'Severity 4.90 1.13 5.02 1.24 2.64 1.06 2.54 .84
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Footnotes For Means and 
Standard Deviation Tables
SLThe higher the mean, the greater the responsibility, license
suspense on/jai1, driver re-education, and fine assigned the
defendant.
bThe higher the mean, the greater the responsibility assigned. 
cThe higher the mean, the more the plaintiff pays medical and 
auto expenses.
^The higher the mean, the greater the retributions awarded 
the plaintiff.
eThe higher the mean, the greater the severity judged for the 
plaintiff.
